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A constitution of social govern-
ance for the European Union  
Dagmar Schiek 
Abstract  
This chapter considers the EU’s socio-economic constitution under the lens of hu-
maneness. It argues that the EU’s unique socio-economic constitution demands equi-
librium of socio-economic integration instead of widening the gap between economic 
integration at EU levels and social integration at national levels. While the EU lacks the 
legislative competences to achieve this equilibrium, the constitutional principle still 
prevails. Indeed, the EU competences reflect its own values as well as the socio-
economic constitutions of its constituent Member States. These frequently do not al-
low for total state-governance of social spheres such as working life, education, care 
or other social services. Instead, societal actors are given scope to (co-)govern these 
spheres at national levels. Accordingly, the apparent tension between the EU’s socio-
economic values and principles and its limited competences in the social policy field 
can be resolved through a dynamic interpretation of the EU Treaties towards a “con-
stitution of social governance”. This interpretation reads the Treaties as authorising 
governance by societal actors. The chapter connects the idea of humanness to the 
ideals of social governance at EU level and proposes two options for practical applica-
tion of the concept. These are rules for trans-national labour markets based on Euro-
pean collective labour agreements and a European higher education sector developed 
by agreements between universities.  
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Introduction  
This chapter contests the increasingly familiar narrative that the EU’s neoliberal orien-
tation can only be conquered by defending national arenas for social policy.1 The chap-
ter argues that the EU’s unique socio-economic constitution demands equilibrium of 
socio-economic integration instead of widening the gap between economic integra-
tion at EU levels and social integration at national levels.2 The lack of a complete set of 
competences on the part of the EU institutions to achieve this equilibrium cannot 
question this constitutional obligation. Indeed, this lack of competences reflects the 
EU’s values as well as the socio-economic constitutions of its constituent Member 
States. These frequently do not allow for total state-governance of social spheres such 
as working life, education, care or other social services. Instead, societal actors are 
given scope to (co-)govern these spheres at national levels. Accordingly, the apparent 
tension between the EU’s socio-economic values and principles and its limited compe-
tences in the social policy field can be resolved through a dynamic interpretation of 
the EU Treaties towards a “constitution of social governance”. This interpretation 
reads the Treaties as authorising governance by societal actors.3  
This concept links well with the theme of this collection: a constitution of social gov-
ernance can be viewed as a proposal for a humane way of socio-economic integration. 
While humaneness can be read in many ways, the interconnectedness of human be-
ings is taken as a starting point here. As a first step, we consider the potential of ‘hu-
maneness’ enshrined in the EU’s normative base and its unique model of regional 
economic integration. The normative demands of this humane socio-economic consti-
tution are then compared, and indeed contrasted, with the EU’s practice, summarising 
processes of decoupling of economic and social integration through judicial govern-
ance of the internal market and the EU’s new economic governance introduced after 
the global economic crisis. In a third step, the demands of re-nationalising social policy 
from the EU and in academia are exposed as unsuitable, and two practical examples of 
the how the constitution of social governance can serve as a basis for alternatives are 
developed.  
                                                          
1 See for example D Ashiagbor, 'Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social 
Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration', European Law Journal, 19 (2013), 303-
24, F Rödl, 'Zu Begriff und Perspektiven demokratischer und sozialer Union', in J Bast and F Rödl 
(eds) Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und soziale Demokratie in der Europäischen Union, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2013), pp. 179-205, F Scharpf, 'Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of 
Democracy', Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, 9 (2011), 163-98. 
2 U Liebert, 'Reconciling market with Social Europe? The EU under the Lisbon Treaty', in D 
Schiek, U Liebert and H Schneider (eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after 
the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 47-73, D Schiek, 'Re-
embedding economic and social constitutionalism: normative perspectives for the EU', in 
European Economic and Social Constitutionalism (2011) pp. 17-46, Idem Economic and Social 
Integration: the Challenge for EU Constitutional Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012). 
3 Schiek, 'The EU Constitution of Social Governance in an Economic Crisis: in Defence of a 
Transnational Dimension to Social Europe', Maastricht Journal of Comparative and European 
Law, 20 (2013), 185-208. 
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A humane socio-economic constitution for the EU?  
In contrast to its public perception, and current practice, the EU’s socio-economic 
model is constituted as deeply humane. Far from being an endeavour by states and 
other public bodies, the European Economic Community was conceived as a medium 
to promote human interaction and interrelation as the basis for peace in Europe. The 
socio-economic realm is the heart of this mission: as ingeniously condensed in the 
Schuman declaration, 4 it was founded on the belief that interaction of people on mar-
kets would bring about an ever closer union of Europe’s peoples. Interconnectedness 
of people was thus already engrained in the EEC’s socio-economic constitution.  
Apart from being at the heart of African and Asian human rights philosophy,5 the in-
terconnectedness of human beings is also a recurrent theme in Western philosophical 
thought. Susan Babbitt establishes in a fascinating way how indeed Chinese and Bud-
dhist thought, some Christian scholars and Marxist reasoning convene on the interac-
tion between mind and bodies, humans with each other and the wider environment as 
the basis for humanism.6 Accordingly, the often demonised culture of rights, which al-
legedly is introduced by European integration into spheres where it was formerly un-
known,7 is not necessarily tied to individualism and isolation. Human rights are meant 
to enable us to self-govern our lives. Self-governance as a societal activity rests on be-
ing interconnected with other human beings as well as with the wider animate and 
non-animate environment. Feminist and environmentalist perspectives on human 
rights contribute to such an interconnected vision of human rights in general.8  
If interaction between persons, in unmitigated form, is an important aspect of hu-
maneness, the scope for such interaction at European levels is a measure for the hu-
maneness of the EU. The EU’s objectives, aims and values indicate that such interac-
tion is at the centre of its mission. The EU was established for the sake of ‘elimination 
of barriers that divide Europe’ (Preamble TEU) and the ‘promotion of peace (..) and 
the well-being of (..) peoples’ (Article 3 (1) TEU). Accordingly the current preambles of 
                                                          
4 It is worthwhile repeating the reference to interaction among people as the base of European 
integration in the well-known declaration: “Europe will be (…) built through concrete achieve-
ments, which first create a de facto solidarity. (...) . The French Government proposes to place 
Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common „High Authority“ (...) The solidar-
ity in production thus established will (…) lay the real foundations for their [the Member 
States’] economic unification” [cited from European Parliament, Selection of Texts Concerning 
Institutional Matters of the Community for 1950-1982 (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1982) (p. 47).] 
5 See for more detail in the introductory chapter ### 
6 S Babbitt, 'Humanism and Embodiment: Remarks on Cause and Effect', Hypatia, 28 (2013), 
733-48. 
7 See, for example, D Mabbet, 'The Development of Rights-based Social Policy in the European 
Union: The Example of Disability Rights', Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (2005), 97-120, 
and D Kelemen, Eurolegalism. The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 2011). 
8 For the classical feminist critique of human rights constrained by male individualism see S 
Moller Okin, 'Equal Citizenship: Gender, Justice and Gender: An unfinished debate', Fordham 
Law Review, 72 (2004), 1537-67, from an environmental perspective A Grear, 'Towards ‘climate 
justice’? A critical reflection on legal subjectivity and climate injustice: warning signals, 
patterned hierarchies, directions for future law and policy', Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment, 5 (2014), 103-33. 
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the Treaties stress the ever closer union of peoples, not of states. The EU’s values 
combine freedom and solidarity with sustainability, both in an ecological and a socio-
economic dimension. (Article 3 TEU) Its commitment to human rights has been charac-
terised as associative, its notion of freedom as social.9  
Since the EU, at the same time, also is committed to establishing an internal market 
(Article 26 TFEU), this market can never be “free” in the sense of providing no limits to 
extracting profit. Instead, the EU is committed to a social market economy, i.e. an 
economy where markets are constituted in such a way that they maximise social inte-
gration. The EU’s value determine the direction which the social market economy is 
meant to take. All this implies that the EU’s socio economic constitution, does not en-
tertain artificial divisions between the social and the economic.  
This is expressed in the structure of the internal market, and in particular in the set of 
four economic freedoms which are constitutive of this institution (Article 26 TFEU). In 
contrast to most regional integration endeavours, the EU internal market comprises 
free movement of persons as an independent category. Granting persons an individual 
right to move freely creates an inextricable link between the internal market and soci-
eties in that it promotes – in the words of the Court of Justice - the “economic and so-
cial interpenetration”10 of the EU. The guarantee of free movement of persons links 
this social interpenetration to the interconnectedness of people. The special quality of 
this interconnectedness is achieved by guaranteeing free movement of persons under 
the condition of equal treatment in the host state. Free movement as such allows per-
sons to share the gains of the internal market, by seeking the highest wages, safest 
working conditions, best housing provision and education systems as well as environ-
mental conditions in the internal market. Only if free movement is tied to equal 
treatment, migrant labour will not have to compete by lower wages. Without that pro-
tection, migrants as newcomers, whose qualification is frequently not accepted as 
equal in practice, and who are not familiar with conditions in their host country, will 
often be disadvantaged, thus practically competing by price. Given the paradoxes of 
the labour market,11 any section of the labour market starting to compete with low 
wages initiates a downward spiral of employment conditions. Similarly, if newcomers 
                                                          
9 I Manners, 'The normative ethics of the European Union ', International Affairs, 84 (2008), 65-
80. 
10 This term has first been used in the Manpower case, related to free movement of workers 
(case 35/70 [1970 ECR 1251, paragraph 10), and subsequently in the Reyners case, on freedom 
of establishment (case 2/74 [1974] E.C.R 631), in which field it is routinely repeated (see for ex-
ample, C-97/09 Schmelz [2010] and C-48/11, ECLI:EU:CL2012:485, paragraph 25).  
11 The structural imbalance or fallacy of labour markets (see W Stützel, Marktpreis und 
Menschenwürde [Market Pricing and Human Dignity], 2nd edn (Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1982) 
results from the facts that workers and self-employed persons lacking significant capital own-
ership do not have any alternative to offering their labour on markets. Thus, if wages fall, they 
will not withhold their labour, but instead expand its supply, for example by taking on a second 
occupation or work on overtime. The dysfunctionality of establishing an ideal price by supply 
and demand is thus particularly pronounced on labour markets, leading even pro-market ideo-
logues to support a functioning system of collective bargaining, underpinned by credible 
threats of collective industrial action B. E Kaufmann, 'Labor's Inequality of Bargaining Power: 
Changes over Time and Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Labor Research, 10 (1989), 
285-98., with references to Adam Smith, Marshall and Pigou. 
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are excluded from provisions of the social state, including benefits, social housing, ac-
cess to education and healthcare, sub-standard existence gains in acceptance, threat-
ening those in a weak socio-economic position in particular. Only if equal treatment of 
free moving workers is maintained, a process of upward spiralling of wages and social 
conditions can result from its exercise.  
This section has shown that the EU’s present socio-economic constitution as provided 
in the Treaties is based on interaction of people, and thus is suitable to establish a 
humane internal market. However, while humaneness may be the EU’s programme, 
the practical implementation of the EU’s socio-economic integration project presently 
fails to institute humaneness.  
The EU’s failure to live up to its socio-economic model 
Practical prevalence of market determinism and austerity 
In practice, the EU is frequently criticised as having created an irreversible dominance 
of market determinism over social values.  
From the 1990,12 the decoupling of economic integration and social policy was de-
scribed as an empirical fact: the EEC had been based on the idea of embedded liberal-
ism13, and accordingly economic integration at European level was accompanied, 
complemented and balanced by national level social policy. The reports by Spaak and 
Ohlin, promoting establishing a common market between the original six Member 
States, suggested that promoting such economic integration while maintaining nation-
al social systems would bring about the desired improvement of living and working 
conditions without any elaborated EU social policy. The radicalised decoupling hy-
pothesis suggests that this decision is not only irreversible, but that the EU has also re-
focused on a neo-liberal consensus, abandoning embedded liberalism. This critique 
suggests that the EU now strives actively for a dismantling of national social policies 
and pursues a new neo-liberal constitutional settlement.14 Some suggest that this is 
conditioned by the recent global economic crisis,15 while others blame the construc-
                                                          
12 F Scharpf, 'The European Social Model: coping with challenges of diversity', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 645-70. 
13 D Ashiagbor, 'Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Wlfare Law in the 
Context of EU Market Integration', European Law Journal, 19 (2013), 303-24. 
14 D Ashiagbor, as last footnote, M Höpner and A Schäfer, 'A New Phase of European 
Integration: Organised Capitalism in Post-Ricardian Europe', West European Politics, 33 (2010), 
344-68, Ch Joerges and F Rödl, 'Informal politics, formalised law and the 'social deficit' of 
European integration: reflections after the judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval', European 
Law Journal, 15 (2009), 1-19, F W Scharpf, 'The asymmetry of European integration, or why the 
EU cannot be a “social market economy”’', Socio-Economic Review, 8 (2010), 211-50, W 
Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 
2013). 
15 St Giubboni, 'European Citizenship and Social Rights in Times of Crisis', German Law Journal, 
15 (2014), 935-64, J Habermas, 'The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a 
Constitutionalization of International Law', The European Journal of International Law, 23 
(2012), 335-48, F Rödl, 'Zu Begriff und Perspektiven demokratischer und sozialer Union', in J 
Bast and F Rödl (eds) Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und soziale Demokratie in der Europäischen Union 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), pp. 179-205. 
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tion of the EMU as the cause, since it decoupled the common currency from socio-
economic politics.16  
While – as will be argued below – the cleavage between the EU’s economic bias and it 
social values may be bridgeable, it is difficult to contradict the critique of the present 
state of the EU socio-economic integration project. However, the present state does 
not necessarily determine the EU’s future. It will be argued that the EU’s failure to live 
up to its ideals is based on a limited understanding of the internal market as well as on 
unnecessarily restrictive approaches to economic and monetary union.  
The internal market mis-read – the alleged neoliberal thrift  
The left-wing critique suggests that the Union drifts towards a neo-liberal polity and 
effectively dis-embeds the internal market at EU levels from social integration project 
pursued at national levels. It is based on observing the dynamic interaction of the 
Court of Justice and the EU Commission in pursuing the internal market project.  
One decisive key to understanding this dynamic is the exceedingly strong role of the 
Court of Justice, which rests on the supranational character of EU law as well as on the 
Court’s monopoly for interpreting positive EU law and finding general principles of EU 
law beyond the written law.17 By its own case law the Court has created a strong com-
petence of judicial governance, which escapes the constraints of the EU’s legislative 
competences. These constraints rest on the principle of conferral and on the EU’s duty 
to respect the Member States’ national identities (Articles 4 and 5 TEU). The Court is 
not so constrained: it has the power to control the compatibility of any national law, 
any behaviour of non-state actors at national level and the EU legislation with Treaty 
law. These judicial competences,18 must thus be reckoned with in the EU competence 
catalogue.  
The Court’s interpretation of the hard law of the internal market, consisting of the di-
rectly effective economic freedoms and competition rules, has a pivotal role in defin-
ing these competences, and at the same time in shaping the scope for social policy 
within the EU socio-economic model. The left-wing critique of the Court’s case law has 
surged only after 2007, when the Court decided two cases in which the rights of work-
ers organised in trade unions seemed to clash with the rights of business to achieve 
                                                          
16 P Whyman, M Baimbridge and A Mullen (eds) The Political Economy of the European Social 
Model (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
17 While there is a textual basis for the Court’s tasks (now: Article 19 TEU), the doctrine of EU 
law’s autonomy, the Court’s monopoly to interpret the positive law and to find general princi-
ples as well as the primacy and direct effect of EU law have been shaped by the Court’s case 
law, which continues as the sole source of these decisive doctrines: declaration number 17 to 
the Lisbon Treaty, without any legally binding force of its own, states “The Conference recalls 
that in accordance with settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union the Trea-
ties and the Law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law 
of Member States, under the conditions laid down by said case law”. The fiftieth anniversary of 
the ground-breaking rulings van Gend (case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1) and Costa (case 6/64 [1964] 
ECR 585) has provoked some academic writing (see, for example, H Ruiz Fabri, G F Sinclair and 
A Rosen (eds), Revisiting Van Gend En Loos" (Paris: Societe de Legislation Compare, 2014).  
18 For more detail see D Schiek (footnote 3Error! Bookmark not defined.),at 189-90, Idem 
(footnote 1Error! Bookmark not defined.) at 227-28. 
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lower wages through relocating or posting workers across an EU border.19 However, 
authors who have consistently observed the Court’s case law on collective labour 
rights had already seen the potential conflict as early as 1998, and had the dubious 
satisfaction of seeing their predictions come true.20  
Overall, the left-wing critique of the law of the internal market is two-pronged: it con-
sists of a procedural and a substantive dimension.  
In its procedural dimension, it challenges the consequences of direct effect and su-
premacy for the survival of national social policy and the creation of EU level equiva-
lent. Those doctrines allow any individual economic actor to challenge such national 
social policy with which they (no longer) agree as incompatible with EU law, while it is 
structurally difficult for the European Union to create such social policy instruments 
which can serve as a functional equivalent to those national social policies which are 
declared as conflicting with EU law. Scharpf’s critique is based on his main research in-
terest in “joint decision traps” and focuses on the limits which judicial governance21 
draws for the European Union to develop social policy: while a small lobbying group 
can establish a line of CJEU case law effectively outlawing national (social) policy, 
achieving a consensus for enacting equivalent social legislation at EU level borders at 
the impossible. While Scharpf initially remained optimistic for EU level social policy 
and suggested ways to achieve it, he later on concluded that the EU could never de-
velop into the social market economy which its Treaties demand it to become.22 Legal 
scholars whose work is situated in the tradition of preferring procedural over substan-
tive justice have taken this critique as a starting point for their demand of rescinding 
                                                          
19 The so-called “Laval quartet” comprises four CJEU cases related to tensions between eco-
nomic freedoms and collective industrial action as well as protection of wages under national 
collective agreements and/or legislation (Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] E.C.R I-11767; Case C-
438/05 Viking [2007] E.C.R I-10779, Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] E.C.R I-01989 and Case C-
319/06 Commission v. Luxembourg [2008] E.C.R I-04323). The expansive academic debate of 
these rulings is beyond any single footnote. It continues in dedicated edited collections, includ-
ing A Bücker and W Warneck (eds), Viking - Laval - Rüffert: Consequences and Policy 
Perspectives (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2010); M Freedland and J Prassl (eds), 
Viking, Laval and Beyond, 1st edn (Oxford: Hart, 2015). 
20 The Court already engaged with the potential conflict of collective labour rights and econom-
ic freedoms in 1997, when it held that France had to intervene to prevent farmers from taking 
collective action against imports of Spanish tomatoes and strawberries, although their action 
was protected by constitutional labour rights in France. Academics who already foresaw the 
wider potential impact on industrial relations then were numerous (e.g. J Kühling, 'Staatliche 
Handlungspflicht zur Sicherung der Grundfreiheiten', Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 52 
(1999), 403-04, P Szczekalla, 'Grundfreiheitliche Schutzpflichten - eine neue Funktion der 
Grundfreiheiten des Gemeinschaftsrechts', Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 118 (1998), 219-24, K 
Muylle, 'Angry farmers and passive policement: private conduct and the free movement of 
goods', European Law Review, 23 (1998), 467-75, G Orlandini, 'The free movemnt of goods as a 
possible "Community" limitation on industrial conflict', European Law Journal, 6 (2000), 341-62; 
though few authors drew the line from Commission v France to Viking and Laval (see for one of 
the exceptions G Orlandini, 'Trade Union rights and market freedoms: the European Court of 
Justice sets out the rules', Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 29 (2008), 573-603). 
21 Scharpf preferred the term judicial legislation (‘The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 44 (2006), 845-64 (p. 853). 
22 F Scharpf as in footnote 1. 
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the direct effect and supremacy of EU law, and to replace these time honoured princi-
ples of EU integration by a conflicts of law regime.23  
If we focus on the substantive demands of the EU’s normative commitments, a mere 
procedural critique of judicial governance is bound to miss its aim. The substantive cri-
tique of the interrelation of economic freedoms and competition law on the one hand, 
and social policy on the other hand seems far more important.24 From these substan-
tive perspectives, the content of the economic freedoms and competition law as 
shaped by the Court of Justice becomes decisive, as well as the Court’s position to-
wards policies promoting social justice at national and EU levels. Here the critique 
culminates in the suggestion that the case law on the hard law of the internal market 
challenges the EU social model.   
According to the embedded liberalism model, the European Social Model rests on the 
functioning of the Member States’ social models. While these national social models 
diverge,25 they converge on a normative common core: societies are responsible for 
individuals’ well-being, and discharge of this responsibility by providing transferred in-
come for periods of loss of (employment-based) self-sufficiency, by maintaining insti-
tutional social services as well as correcting imbalances in markets through regulation, 
which in labour markets is partly based on collective bargaining underpinned by credi-
ble threats of industrial action.26 Substantively, economic freedoms and competition 
law as interpreted by the Court become the yard stick for judging the national emana-
tions of the European Social Model.  
Such judgments should not, however, outlaw the European social model, if guided by 
the Treaty. As indicated initially, the economic freedoms are contradictory in so far as 
free movement of workers (and also of self-employed persons who only sell their own 
                                                          
23 C Joerges, 'The Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts of Law as Constitutional Form', RECON 
On-line working papers, 5 (2010), 1-37, M Everson and C Joerges, 'Reconfiguring the Politics-
Law Relationship in the Integration Project through Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism', European 
Law Journal, 18 (2012), 644-66. 
24 S Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution. A Labour Law 
Perspective (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), D Schiek (as footnote 1Error! Bookmark not defined.), P 
Syrpis, EU Intervention in Domestic Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
25 For sociological approaches to classifications see G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). and M Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare. 
European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), for an overview of different national models see W A. Arts and J 
Gelissen, 'Models of the Welfare State', in Francis Castles and others (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 569-83. 
26 D Schiek, 'The European Social Model and the Services Directive', in Ulla Neergaard, Ruth 
Nielsen and Lynn Roseberry (eds) The Services Directive - Consequences for the Welfare State 
and the European Social Model (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2008), pp. 25-63 (p. 38), idem, 
'The EU's socio-economic model(s) and the crisi(e)s - any perspectives?', in D Schiek (ed) The EU 
Economic and Social Model in the Global Crisis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 8-30 (pp. 3-4). 
More recently, D Vaughan-Whitehead distinguished six institutional pillars of the European So-
cial Model: increased minimum rights on working conditions, sustainable universal social pro-
tection systems, inclusive labour markets, strong and well-functioning social dialogue, public 
services and services of general interest and social inclusion and cohesion ('The European 
Social Model in Times of Crisis - an Introduction', in idem (ed) The European Social Model in 
Crisis: Is Europe Losing its Soul? , (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 1-65). 
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services) underpins EU level social rights to enjoy equal treatment in the host states, 
which constitutes an element of the EU social model in itself. However, economic 
freedoms also enhance the position of business. The Court’s reading of free move-
ment of goods and freedom to provide services and of freedom of establishment for 
companies has constitutionalised the economic freedoms as rights to cross-border 
market access for business across borders. Free movement of goods serves is triggered 
by any state rule which may potentially or actually impact on trans-border trade,27 
while free movement of persons and services serves as defence against state and non-
state activity, and precludes any measure “which might place EU nationals at a disad-
vantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another 
Member State”.28 If national labour standards, social security provisions or rights to 
take collective industrial action fall under the hammer of internal market case law in 
one Member State, this has knock-on effects in so far as free movement of business 
throughout the internal market creates the so called regulatory competition.  
These potentially negative tendencies are not, without counterweights. The Court has 
progressively expanded the potential justifications for restrictions of economic free-
doms.29 The reasons for this can be read as a certain regulatory vision: in the absence 
of EU level legislation, the economic freedoms to not render all differences between 
national regulatory environments inadmissible. Instead, restrictions resulting from 
such differences can be justified by reference to any general interest. In parallel the EU 
itself must take general interests into account when creating legislation in the internal 
market (Article 114, 115 TFEU). Legislating for so-called non-economic interests30 is 
thus not the exception, but should constitute the rule in internal market legislation. 
The general interests the EU must safeguard include some elements of the EU social 
model, though mainly legislation for social rights should be based on Article 153 TFEU 
as well as on Article 47 TFEU as far as the coordination of social security systems is 
concerned. Read in this way, the law of the internal market itself precludes any un-
distorted competition of legal orders, and provides a framework in which national so-
cial models can be safeguarded.31 However, the critique of the judge-made economic 
constitution is correct in so far as the general interests, including those supporting the 
EU social models, only enter the play as justifications, while the economic freedoms do 
not require any justification. Social standards are systematically on the back foot if 
pursued at national levels. 
From an internal market perspective, this is a logical consequence of the potentially 
disrupting effects of differences between national regulatory models: if business 
needs to comply with 28 different standards, transnational activity is less likely to 
                                                          
27 CJEU case C-573/13 Ålands Vindkraft ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, paragraph 66, with reference to 
case 8/74 Dassonville ECLI:EU:C:1974:82 paragraph 5. 
28 CJEU Case C-202/11 LAS ECLI:EU:C:2013:239, paragraph 19. 
29 The recent Ålands Vindkraft case (footnote 27) can serve as an example: the Court allowed 
Member States to use environmental protection as a justification of discriminatory restrictions 
on imports.  
30 B de Witte, 'Legislating for non-econmic interests', in P Syrpis (ed) EU Judiciary and Member 
Staes, (Oxford: Hart, 2012), pp. 25-46. 
31 D Schiek, above footnote 26. 
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emerge. Thus, the internal market perspective seems to suggest that any European 
Social Model would have to be progressively realised by EU level rules. However, these 
rules are not likely to emerge. First, in the wake of decades of preaching de-regulation, 
the political will to provide EU level social standards has been weakened considerably. 
The 2015 work programme of the EU Commission, accordingly, contains many more 
measures in the social policy field which will be discontinued than measures that shall 
continue.32 Second, the EU lacks the competence to regulate in a wide variety of fields: 
it only has coordinative competences in promoting social inclusion and reforming so-
cial security systems, as long as the latter is not necessary in order to facilitate free 
movement of persons, and lacks any competence in the field of wages, industrial col-
lective action and collective bargaining. Since the Court of Justice continues to control 
national level collective action, collective bargaining and policies for social inclusion 
and social security for internal market compliance, in these fields a deregulatory thrust 
remains. This mismatch is addressed by the Constitution of Social Governance.   
“New economic governance” - a misguided answer to the crisis?  
The perceived threat to the European social model is acerbated by the dynamics of 
economic and monetary union, which again have been intensified by a package of 
measures aimed at combating the EU economic crisis. These measures are commonly 
referred to as “new economic governance”, 33 although this term lacks precision in 
several dimensions.  
European economic and monetary union (EMU), introduced by the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty, has been targeted with a two-pronged critique. The more optimist section of 
the critique focuses on the asymmetry of EMU, as established in Article 119 TFEU and 
spelled out in the remainder of the Treaty chapter on economic and monetary policy: 
a single monetary policy coexists with the principle that, on the one hand, there is a 
single monetary and exchange rate policy as well as the euro as the single currency, 
while economic policy remains a national responsibility which is coordinated in the 
council.34 While Member States whose currency is not the Euro are bound by the 
                                                          
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start (COM (2014) 910 final), Annexes 1-3 
33 See, for example, K Armstrong, 'The new governance of EU fiscal discipline', European Law 
Review, 38 (2013), 601-17; by contrast, J Zeitlin and B Vanhercke, Socialising the European 
Semester? Economic Governance and Social Policy Coordination in Europe (Stockholm: SIEPS, 
2014) refer to socio-economic governance.  
34 This chapter does not offer sufficient space to fully evaluate EMU. For an overview from the 
perspectives of political economy see A Verdun, 'The European Currency in Turbulent Times - 
Austerity Policy in Brussels as the only way out?', in D Schiek (ed) The EU Economic and Social 
Model int eh Global Crisis. Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 45-70, P 
Arestis, G Fontana and M Sawyers, 'The Dysfunctional Nature of the Economic and Monetary 
Union', in the same edited colletion, pp. 23-44; for an evaluation from a legal-comparative per-
spective see Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson and Jens Hartig Danielsen The Economic and 
Monetary Union: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Economic Governance within 
the EU. The XXIV FIDE Congress in Copenhagen 2014 (Copenhagen: DJOF, 2014), for an evalua-
tion under the perspective of European integration strategies see S Fabbrini, After the Euro 
Crisis. A New Paradigm on the Integration of Europe (Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, 
2014). 
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commitment to price stability as the main aim of monetary policy, the impact is more 
severe in Member States whose currency is the Euro. These lose the opportunity to 
devalue their currencies, which leaves mainly labour costs and social policy measures 
as means to counteract economic crisis through internal devaluation.35 This has led to 
the expectation that the EU’s common social policy would be ‘sacrificed on the altar of 
the common currency’.36 These concerns were reaffirmed by the EU’s institutions’ re-
actions to the EU currency crisis, which again resulted from a global economic crisis 
triggered by irresponsible banking and real estate markets in the US and some EU 
Member States. These measures are now evaluated as resulting in the structural dis-
mantling of the European Social Model.37  
The term “new economic governance”, by which these measures are usually referred 
to, is arguably of the euphemisms of EU policies. “New governance” as initially de-
fined38 refers to replacing top down government by governance based on interactive 
bottom-up and top-down processes and interaction of state governments with socio-
economic actors. In the EU, it was associated with the open method of coordination, 
which promised a way to overcome the dead end of EU social policy between reluc-
tance of Member States to commit and increasing deregulatory impact of the internal 
market.39 Many had expected that civil society at large or at least those being affected 
by specific regimes would be able to participate in EU level new governance.40  
As new economic governance, new governance has grown into its original ambit: the 
EU Treaties first introduced elaborate combinations of top down and bottom up pro-
cesses for the coordination of economic policy (now Articles 120-126 TFEU). “New 
economic governance” refers to the recent attempts to achieve stricter coordination 
and convergence of economic policy, and thus to overcome the asymmetry of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. It relies on a technocratic style of governance, in that new 
                                                          
35 For an overview with hindsight see J Grahl and P Teague, 'Reconstructing the eurozone: the 
role of EU social policy', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37 (2013), 677-92 
36 C Hay, 'Contemporary Capitalism, Globalisation, Regionalisation and the Persistence of 
National Variation', Review of International Studies, 26 (2000), 509-31, M Panić, 'The Euro and 
the Welfare State', in social welfare and eu law, ed. by M Dougan and E Spaventa (Oxford: Hart, 
2005), pp. 25-44. 
37 Ch Hermann, 'Crisis, structural reform and the dismantling of the European Social Model', 
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2014, 1-18, D Vaughan-Whitehead, as in footnote 26. 
38 See for example D M Trubek and L Trubek, 'Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social 
Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination', European Law Journal, 11 (2005), 343-
64 and Jonathan Zeitlin, Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New 
Constitutional Compromise? (Mannheim: EUROGOV 2005, available at http://www.mzes.uni-
mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/wp/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-04.pdf ). 
39 See, for example D Ashiagbor, The European Employment Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), M Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law: 
Coordinating EU Social Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), M 
Heidenreich and J Zeitlin (eds) Changing European Employment and Welfare Regimes: the 
Influence of the Open Method of Coordination on National Reforms, (New York: Routledge, 
2009). 
40 The literature on governance is too wide to be referenced in full here. For an introduction 
see D Levi-Faur, 'From "Big Government" to "Big Governance"? ', in idem (ed) The Oxford 
Handbook on Governance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 29-44. As well as the 
chapters in that edited collection. 
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economic governance is based on surveillance of Member States performance to cer-
tain targets. This comprises three fields: fiscal surveillance focused on budget stability 
and containment of government debt,41 macroeconomic surveillance striving to con-
tain imbalances in the Eurozone and beyond by paying attention to external and inter-
nal processes that may impact on the stability of national economies42 and finally co-
ordination of socio-economic policy (based on Articles 121 (2) and 148 (2) TFEU).43 It 
also comprises specific measures in cases where Member States can no longer serve 
their government debt and apply for assistance by the EU or the IMF or both – this is 
now the ambit of the ESM, which has partly reintegrated into the EU framework.44 In 
this last branch, the governance is established through contractual agreements 
(“Memoranda of Understanding”), originally drafted by the Member States on the one 
hand, and the EU Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF on the other 
hand, but enforced under enormous pressure since fulfilment of these memoranda is 
a precondition for receipt of financial support. 
For the purpose of this chapter, a short overview of the regular procedures is fully suf-
ficient. The EU Commission and Council, partly in conversation with the Member State 
affected, define targets, often quantifiable, and the Member States respond by devel-
oping measures to achieve these targets. If these targets are not met, the lack of en-
forceability before courts is compensated addressed by the so called corrective arms 
of the new governance instruments.45 Member States may have to make non-interest 
bearing deposits, interest bearing deposits or pay fines.46 The TSCG adds some more 
instruments for effectiveness, such as partnership programmes (Article 5) imposing 
“structural reforms” on Eurozone countries under an excessive deficit procedure, fur-
ther specified by regulation 473/2013 TFEU (Article 9).  
The whole process is coordinated through the European Semester, which has been 
given a legal base in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP1).47 
Originally, the European Semester only ran from January to July (hence the term “se-
mester”). The Commission’s Annual Growth Report (AGR) in January is followed by the 
European Council’s adoption of Guidance for national policies in March, which is re-
                                                          
41 Articles 126 TFEU, Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure [OJ (2008) L115/279], 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, last amend-
ment by Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011of the Parliament and the Council [OJ (2011) L306/12] – 
Stability and Growth Pact 1. 
42 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council on the preven-
tion and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [OJ (2011) L306/25] and Regulation (E)) 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council on enforcement measures to correct 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [OJ (2011) L 306/08]. 
43 For more detail see A de Streel, 'The Evolution of the EU Economic Governance since the 
Treaty of Maastricht: An Unfinished Task', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 20 (2013), 336-62. 
44 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council on the strengthen-
ing of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability [OJ (2013) L 140/1]. 
45 Article 3 (4a) of Reg 1467/97 as amended by Regulation 1175/2011 (SGP 2). 
46 Regulation 1173/2011 Articles 4-6 and 8. 
47 Council Regulation 1466/97, as amended by Regulation 1175/2011 (SGP1). 
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flected upon at national levels in April, only to be followed by the Commission’s draft 
for Country Specific Recommendations in May and their endorsement by the Europe-
an Council in June. As an institutional response to public protests against post-crisis 
austerity measures,48 a “social dimension” has been added, 49 which expanded the se-
mester into a nine-month process: preceding the AGR, there is now a Tripartite Social 
Summit (see Article 152 TFEU) in October, an additional macroeconomic dialogue in 
November and another EU level macroeconomic dialogue and Tripartite Social Summit 
in February and March.50 Nevertheless, nine months seem very short for realising any 
ambition to initiate mutual learning processes. There is one month (May) for the par-
ticipation of national parliaments, and another one (April) for national social partner 
involvement, while the EU level social dialogue takes place in November. The Europe-
an semester remains a top-down process, and it remains to be seen whether the en-
visaged improvements will fundamentally change its procedural flaws.  
Normatively, the EU’s social values apply to economic and monetary union: article 119 
TFEU, the initial article of the chapter on EMU, refers to article 3 TEU and thus to social 
justice and the social market economy, though it also stresses the principles of an 
open market economy and free competition and establishes the primacy of price sta-
bility. Further, the employment chapter relates to the objectives of Article 3 TEU pri-
marily by reference to promoting a skilled and adaptable work force. The question, 
which is as yet unanswered, is whether the “new economic governance” in promoting 
and enforcing EMU can be reconciled with the EU’s social values substantively. This 
can be doubted since the dynamics resulting from new economic governance as man-
agement by objectives are coupled with the macro-economic structure engrained in 
the legal frame of the common currency. Without any official monetary adjustment 
facility, and primarily bound to price stability and containment of government debt, 
any adjustment to cyclical shocks is difficult. As a further complication, that adjust-
ment is left to the Member States, which have little choice than reverting to manipu-
lating wage levels and adjusting social expenditure. The common currency is thus 
based on the perception of a multitude of national economies – in contrast with the 
internal market, which is based on the gradual elimination of borders in the socio-
economic sphere. “New economic governance” allows the EU to actively influence na-
tional social policies and wage levels within Member States in order to achieve such 
adjustment. The time honoured principle of progressively harmonising living and 
working conditions in an upward trajectory is being sacrificed in favour of differentia-
tion.51 In particular, differentiation of national social policy is imposed in response to 
cyclical shocks which impact differently on Member States with different economies. 
The shift in relation between Europe’s societies and the subset of economic integra-
tion is profound: while in the internal markets national societies are justified in holding 
up values against market integration as long as this does not result in (re-)establishing 
                                                          
48 J Zeitlin and B Vanhercke (2014), as in footnote 33, at 62, using the softer term “discontent”.  
49 Idem. 
50 See EU Commission, Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary 
Union COM (2013) 690 final (Brussels: European Union, 2013) (pp. 12, 18). 
51 C Degryse, M Jepsen and Ph Pochet, The Euro crisis and its impact on national and European 
social policies (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) working paper 2013. 0 5, 2013). 
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national borders at different levels, in the EMU national societies are required, under 
threat of fines and payments, to differentiate and lower protection levels. 
Is there any way out of here? A humane EU through a consti-
tution of social governance 
A structural deficit in EU governance procedures 
The dynamics unleashed by the practical application of the internal market through 
the Court of Justice and the initiation of “new economic governance” by the EU insti-
tutions as a response to the shortcomings of EMU point to a deeper problem, which 
needs to be addressed at a conceptual level. It is suggested that both processes illus-
trate the difficulty of developing EU level rules that would overcome the economic bi-
as of the EU’s governance as they emerged in both dimensions.  
The notion of governance is used here in a wide sense, as encompassing any activity 
aimed at giving direction to society, including economy, maximizing cooperation with 
those who are being governed.52 The complexity of governance is exacerbated by the 
multiple governance levels of the Union, Member States, regions and municipalities. 
Accordingly, a mix of governance styles is needed to achieve any of the EU’s objec-
tives, 53 moving on a continuum between hierarchy and markets,54 involving hybrid 
forms and different modes of cooperation often labelled ‘new governance’ or ‘soft 
law’.55 This wide conception allows to characterise the Court’s activity as judicial gov-
ernance. This form of governance gives direction to societies and economies in the EU 
by developing authoritative guidance. Just as the directly effective law of the EU, this 
governance is strictly hierarchical. On the other end of the spectrum, forms of negoti-
ated governance, often referred to as new governance, involve governing through dis-
course and agreement between those capable of reverting to hierarchical governance. 
Governance by incentives, as used in the so called “new economic governance”, con-
stitutes a hybrid between hierarchical and negotiated governance. Governance as a 
notion is neither positive nor negative56 – it can be undemocratic, coercive and illegit-
imate, as well as humane, participative and innovative.  
                                                          
52 See for a similar notion V Benáček, 'Three Dimensions of Modern Social Governance: 
Markets, Hierarchies, Kinship', in A Rosenbaum and J Nemec (eds) Democratic Governance in 
the CEES, (Bratislava: NISPAcee Publisher, 2006), 407-28. and H Schepel, The Constitution of 
Private Governance (Oxford & Portland: Hart, 2005). 
53 D M Trubek and L Trubek, (as footnote 38), T Börzel, 'The European Union - a Unique 
Governance Mix? ', in D Levi-Faur (ed) The Oxford Handbook on Governance, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 639-52. 
54 D Levi-Faur, as in footnote 40, at 31-32. 
55 A Peters, 'Soft Law as a New Mode of Governance', in U Diederichs, W Reiners and W 
Wessels (eds) The Dynamics of Change in EU Governance, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 
21-51, at 21. 
56 By contrast, some author use the term governance as synonym with Foucauldian govern-
mentality, thus using it as a negative notion describing how the EU “new economic govern-
ance” neglects European Social Rights (see A Poulou, 'Austerity and European Social Rights: 
How Cna Courts Protect Europe's Lost Generation?', German Law Journal, 15 (2014), 1145-76, 
at 1150-51). 
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Re-nationalising of social policy?  
The dominant proposition for a way out of these dilemmas is to demand the renation-
alisation of social policy. The left-wing critique of the EU’s bias in favour of economic 
actors now alleges that the EU is at a point of no return, and structurally unable to re-
couple European integration and EU level social integration. As a logical consequence, 
social policy must be left to the national level, and protected at that level These au-
thors consider, for example, that there can be no “labour constitution” at EU levels ex-
cept for a fundamental norm demanding that “the labour constitutions of the member 
states remain autonomous” which again means that there must not be a comprehen-
sive body of EU level labour law57, or that EU welfare states can at best be nested, i.e. 
coordinated -  any EU level of the main social insurance branches established in Conti-
nental Europe should not even be aspired.58 This EU level discourse finds its equal in a 
global discourse where some authors call for reestablishment of embedded liberal-
ism.59 These voices would suggest that there is no need to pursue EU level regulatory 
social policy. All that is required is that the EU leaves the Member States alone in how 
they generate their own social (or labour) constitutions.  
Ironically, as has been shown above, the strategy of the EU institutions and its Mem-
ber States for overcoming the economic crisis has some common ground with these 
demands. Instead of approximating national law and policies, the new economic gov-
ernance has at times encouraged Member States to pursue diversification and differ-
entiation. While the guidelines encourage wage growth in some Member States, they 
preach wage restraint in others, for example.60   
However, the eventual success of this diversification is highly questionable. Embedded 
liberalism failed for the specific reason that economic integration is not separable 
                                                          
57 F Rödl, 'The labour constitution of the European Union', in R Letelie and A Jose Menendez 
(eds) The Sinews of European Peace. Reconstituting the Democratic Legitimacy of the Socio-
Economic Constitution of the European Union, ed. by (Oslo: ARENA, 2009), pp. 367-426 (407-
12). 
58 M Ferrera, 'Modest Beginnings, Timid Progresses: What Next for Social Europe?', in B 
Cantillon, H Verschueren and P Ploscar (eds) Social Inclusion and Social Protection in the EU: 
Interactions between Law and Policy, (Cambridge, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012), pp. 17-39., idem 
as in footnote 25. 
59 A Bieler, J Hilary and I Lindberg, 'Trade Unions, Free Trade and the Problem of Transnational 
Solidarity: An Introduction', Globalizations, 11 (2014), 1-9, see also by the same authors 
'Conclusion: Towards Transnational Solidarity on 'Free Trade' Policy?', Globalizations, 11 
(2014), 155-64. 
60 The detailed evaluation of “new economic governance” in the European Semester is beyond 
the ambit of a single article or paper. The ETUI has delivered a comprehensive evaluation of the 
Country Specific Recommendations in relation to social policy, broadly conceived S Clauwaert, 
The country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the social field (Brussels: European Trade 
Union Institute, 2013), idem The country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the social field. An 
overview and comparison - update including the CSRs 2014-2015 (Brussels: ETUI, 2014); for a 
detailed analysis of only the 2013 CSR see S Bekker, European socioeconomic governance in 
action: coordinating social policies in the third semester (Brussels: OSE, 2015). The national 
constitutional critique of the Memorandums of Understanding and their impact on national so-
cial and welfare systems is analysed by C Kilpatrick and B de Witte (eds) Social Rights in Times 
of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights Challenges (Florence: European 
University Institute, 2014), also published as special issue of European Social Law (1/2014). 
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from the social sphere in principle. The integration of markets will always posit territo-
rially constrained social policy regimes against each other: if labour can be sourced 
cheaper in certain corners of an integrated market that is where labour intense pro-
duction of goods and services will move, while those services and goods which require 
highly qualified and appropriately paid labour will be generated elsewhere, in highly 
capitalised regions where also highly educated persons are available and in a position 
to engage in the related innovation. Labour markets are markets too in a market 
economy, and easing free movement to such a degree that it does not lead to losses 
and partial social disintegration (as it presently does) will contribute to alleviating so-
cial misery resulting from unemployment generated in the wake of this. Conversely, 
the state-based and state-funded provision of high-quality living conditions will only 
be affordable in such Member States where the conditions described above prevail, 
and state budgets profit from tax revenue derived from a stable surplus. Defending 
territorially constrained social rights will thus not do justice to EU citizens in those 
Member States whose economy is focused on agriculture, low-qualified services and 
not on exporting complex industrialised goods: those economies cannot hope to pro-
duce the constant trade surplus which enables Member States such as Germany and 
Finland to maintain high level welfare compromises within a common currency area.61  
Accordingly, without denying the value of diversity, some EU level activity to achieve 
socio-economic upward movement is needed.  
EU level legislation 
Alternatively, there are presently a number of proposals to use the EU competences 
more expansively. Proposals include actions to align pension and employment systems 
to ageing populations through using the competence related to age discrimination, a 
directive on measures providing financial support for those excluded from the labour 
market or minimum requirements for national unemployment insurances, expanding 
existing EU employment directives to apply to workers (instead of only employees) 
and demanding transparency for employers,62 as well as legislation for social rights 
based on the citizenship chapter.63 Further, reforms of the posted workers directive to 
increase wage levels of posted workers, in particular aligning their rights to the rights 
of agency workers used within the jurisdiction of a Member State, or to establish legis-
lation addressing the problem of employment relationships based on the on-call prin-
ciple could be considered, as well as creating specific social security institutions for 
free moving workers.64  
However, these proposals would not suffice to address the structural imbalance be-
tween the EU’s social values and the deregulatory thrust of its internal market, cou-
pled with the structural imbalance of economic and monetary union. The EU institu-
                                                          
61 D Schiek, as in footnote 3, at pp. 230-35. 
62 C Barnard and G de Baere, Towards a European Social Union. Achievements and Possibilities 
under the Current EU Constitutional Framework (Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 2014). 
63 D Kostakopoulou, Co-Creating European Union Citizenship: A Policy Review (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2013). 
64 The latter two proposals could be based on Article 153 TFEU, the former only require re-
forms of existing directives.  
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tions do not possess the competences to address issues such as wage imbalance, the 
establishment of new social insurance branches at EU levels (except if limited to the 
needs of free moving workers) and the creation of an EU level system of financing 
higher education, to name just a few examples. Instead of promoting European level 
social legislation outside the EU framework,65 this chapter proposes to interpret the 
EU legal framework as containing a constitution of social governance by default.  
A Constitution of Social Governance  
The concept 
The notion “social governance” signifies that societal self-regulation should comple-
ment EU and state governance. Social governance emerges as the means through 
which EU level regulation in social policy realms can be achieved without a time-
consuming Treaty change or intergovernmental agreements between EU Member 
States.  
The base of this proposal is a systematic interpretation of the EU competence regime 
in the light of the EU’s values and guiding norms. The apparent lack of all the explicit 
competences to activate values such as social justice, solidarity and social inclusion 
does not have to be read as a contradiction in terms. 66 It is true that the EU legislator 
cannot regulate wages or industrial collective action (Article 153 [5] TFEU) or an EU 
wide higher education system (Article 165 TFEU); and doubts have been voiced 
whether the competence to complement the activities of Member States in the field 
of social security and social protection for workers allows for the establishment of EU 
level social security systems.67 The question is whether this condemns any European 
level rules to move outside the field of EU law. On a systematic and dynamic interpre-
tation of European Union law, a different result appears more convincing. The appar-
ent gaps in the EU competence regime cannot be interpreted as excluding any EU level 
regulation and reserving the social policy fields indicated above for national level regu-
lation. Instead, the rules exempting certain fields, and in particular wage setting and 
industrial conflict, from the legislative grasp of the EU institutions mirrors a principle 
common to the Member States. Many member states leave the setting of wages to 
the two sides of industry, partly on the basis of constitutional guarantees of collective 
bargaining, industrial action and social partner autonomy. This precludes any EU insti-
tutional legislation of the same field as well. Beyond that, attempting to capture all the 
problems of socio-economic integration by institutional action through the EU chan-
nels will most certainly have a smothering effect on transnational societal exchange, 
which again is the practical precondition for successful EU integration. The apparent 
lack of competences in the EU socio-economic constitution must thus be read as a 
                                                          
65 J Lievens and others, A Social Compact for a Social Union? (Leuven : KU Leuven Euroforum, 
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66 D Schiek (2013), as in footnote 3, at 186, St Weatherill, 'Use and Abuse of the EU's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: on the improper veneration of 'freedom of contract'', European Review of 
Contract Law, 10 (2014), 167-82, at 177. 
67 In 2013/14 the debate around an EU unemployment insurance was most relevant here, also 
aiming at finding a way of anticyclical financing (see C Barnard and G de Baere, as footnote 63). 
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conscious choice in favour of societal rule making or social governance. In a constitu-
tional sense this concept must only include such regulatory activities which are not 
delegitimised by undue dominance of already powerful economic actors. Not all pri-
vate governance is thus suitable to be classed as social governance. However, there 
are numerous options for legitimate governance of non-state actors. Beyond the es-
tablished models of industrial relations, these include actions b charitable organisa-
tions, insurance funds and mutual societies for example engaged in care, or autono-
mously constituted universities providing quality higher education. Those actors, col-
laborating in European networks or deciding to found EU level organisations, could al-
so devise EU level rules. The incomplete competence regime established by the EU 
Treaties can be read to mirror the anti-totalitarian elements of its Member States’ 
constitutions in so far as the EU, as its Member States, leaves scope for societal rule 
making. In accepting such a constitution of social governance, even beyond EU in-
duced deliberations, the EU constitution would also allow for transnational social inte-
gration to emerge from below.  
Indications for practical relevance 
Practical examples can easily be developed by utilising recent and not so recent case 
law by the Court as illustration of transnational conflicts where the diverse layers of 
social integration are less than perfectly aligned.  
Self-regulation on transnational labour markets: European trade union free-
dom 
The widely debated Laval quartet68 can be viewed as illustrating the complexities of 
determining employment conditions in multi-layered labour markets from a tip-of-the-
iceberg perspective. Three of the four cases (all with the exception of the Viking case) 
evolved around “posting of workers”. The term has come to describe a more and more 
wide-spread phenomenon: cooperation of business typically involve employed work-
ers, but certain types of economic activity rely on mobile labour traditionally. The 
transport sector is one example, and the building sector has come to represent anoth-
er example. In those sectors, labour costs also constitute a major element of the costs 
of offering services. Mobile labour can be deployed to work in locations away from 
home, or recruited on the spot. Workers who move away to work would be natural 
beneficiaries of internal market rights relating to equal treatment in the states where 
they work temporarily. Their employer would perceive equal treatment of their work-
ers as less beneficial if national wage levels differ, and would desist equal treatment 
rights if employment conditions in the country where the worker delivers their labour 
are more advantageous. Posting has been accepted as a way to achieve this: maintain-
ing the legal illusion that the worker who moves has not actually moved, the employer 
can in principle rely on conditions used at his place of establishment. The Court has in-
sisted that those workers cannot rely on free movement of workers and framed their 
movement as an expression of their employers’ rights to provide services instead,69  
while accepting numerous justifications for Member States to demand that service 
                                                          
68 See above footnote 19. 
69 Cases C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803 , paragraph 21-22; 113/89 Rush Portuguesa 
[1990] ECR I-1417 paragraph 15. 
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providers offer some of the basic national conditions to their workers.70 This is prob-
lematic since the different treatment has entrenched posting as a substitute for free 
movement, especially in the wake of exceptions to free movement at national level. 
Once the business model was developed, it has spread across a range of sectors. As a 
result, posting is now entrenched, and many workers are not given an alternative if 
they want to move into Western labour markets.71  
The Laval quartet, and in particular the Laval case itself, evolved around trade union 
strategies responding to such unequal treatment. In 2005, the strategy of the Swedish 
building workers union was to demand at all costs that posted workers would be paid 
in line with Swedish collective agreements. As is well known, the staging of successful 
industrial action to that effect was classified as unjustified violation of the employers’ 
rights to freedom to provide services. In those times, the Swedish trade union argua-
bly assumed a paternalistic position towards the workers posted from Latvia, who 
were not their members. Times have changed though, since the case – next to provid-
ing a starting point for an intense academic debate- also spurred transnational trade 
union cooperation.72  
The facts of the more recent case Sähköalojen ammttillitto73 are an example for such 
development: Polish workers who were posted to Finland on a long-term basis were 
members of the relevant Finnish trade union. That trade union subsequently offered 
the service of claiming outstanding pay claims for the workers, since Finnish law allows 
for workers to cede their claims to a trade union. The dispute evolved around substan-
tial elements of pay such as being paid in line with qualification and experience. In this 
case, the Court not only accepted that differentiated wages and wage supplements 
had to be paid to posted workers under EU legislation, but also recognised that the 
trade union in the host state could perform services for posted workers. This also im-
plies that posted workers have the right to join a trade union in the state where they 
perform their work. Rights to join a trade union in the host state have traditionally 
been one element of free movement of workers. Speaking in a more principled way, 
one could state that the CJEU acknowledges a subject status for posted workers in this 
case.   
This case constitutes a good starting point for expanding on the concept of a constitu-
tion of social governance. It aptly illustrates the potential of transnational activities 
which could result in EU level rules not emanating from the EU institutions them-
                                                          
70 The requirement to pay a statutory minimum wage was accepted (C-369/96 Arblade & 
Leloup [1999] ECR I-8453, C-164/99 Portuguaia Construcões [2002] ECR I-787), as well as de-
manding social security payments for wage continuation during work stoppage due to winter 
weather (case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905) or to secure annual holiday pay (case C-
490/04 COM v Germany [2007] ECR I-6095) and the requirement to provide surety for workers’ 
wages (case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller [2004] ECR I-9553). 
71 Bertelsmann Stiftung, (2014) Harnessing European Labour Mobility (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2014) (pp. 59, 74).. 
72 K Lovén-Seldén, 'Laval and Trade Union Cooperation: Views on the Mobilizing Potential of 
the Case', International Journal on Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 30 (2014), 
87-104. 
73 C-396/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:86. 
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selves. Obviously, the problem which underlies this case cannot be solved by case law, 
nor by agreements and rules elaborated only in Finland. The posted workers will, in all 
likelihood, return to Poland at some point, if only temporary. It is at this point that 
they would need additional protection, should their success in securing adequate 
wages while in Finland be sustained. If no additional regulatory framework is in place, 
the Polish employer could claim the wages which were won before Finnish courts back 
from the workers. Since ceding of claims to trade unions is not accepted in Poland, 
such claims would in all likelihood succeed. Accordingly what is gained in the territory 
of one state may be lost in the other again. Once again, territorial approaches are un-
satisfactory in the reality of free moving EU citizens. Transnational agreements could 
offer more suitable solutions. For example, an EU level collective labour agreement in 
the construction industry could provide rules on equal treatment of posted construc-
tion workers, specifying the parameters for equal treatment of posted workers in the 
host states. Given the privileges the EU legislator has bestowed on employers who 
post, achieving such an agreement might take several steps. One step towards an 
agreement to full equal treatment could consist in an agreement on protecting the 
payments of workers after their return to their home state. In relation to EU level col-
lective agreements, the legal arguments in favour of their acceptance can be support-
ed by reference to the Treaties’ specific framework on social partner agreements, 
which is not the focus of this article.74 The advantage of a constitution of social gov-
ernance should be seen in the option to develop such agreements for certain sectors, 
and also between a faction of trade unions and employers’ associations which have a 
specific interest in such rules. The construction sector has been identified as one sec-
tor where an overlap in interest of management and labour regarding the posting 
phenomenon might emerge.75 There is no reason to not consider sectoral agreements, 
possibly only covering the most affected countries, as a legitimate start for EU level 
regulation between management and labour.  
Once management and labour agree, the Court of Justice might constitute a barrier for 
success for such agreements. As in the Laval case, a stray employer who does not feel 
comfortable with the overall agreement or its enforcement can avail themselves of the 
Court’s support if the case law remains unchanged. As elaborated else-where, there 
are a number of options for the Court to take a new approach to the realities of collec-
tive bargaining in an economic area without frontiers, relying on the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights and the enhanced relevance of the ECtHR case law from 2009.76 To 
summarise these, the Court would have to perceive of collective bargaining agree-
                                                          
74 On this see D Schiek, 'Europäische Kollektivvereinbarungen (European Collective 
Agreements)', in W Däubler (ed) Tarifvertragsgesetz. Kommentar, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2012a), 268-322; idem 'Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to Read Articles 139 EC', Industrial Law Journal, 34 (2005), 23-56, and also P 
Syrpis, 'Reconciling Economic Freedoms and Social Rights - The Potential of Commission v 
Germany (Case C-271/08, Judgment of 15 July 2010)', Industrial Law Journal, 40 (2011), 222-29, 
A Veldman, 'The Protection of the Fundamental Right to Strike within the Context of the 
European Internal Market: Implications of the Forthcoming Accession of the EU to the ECHR', 
Utrecht Law Review, 9 (2013), 104-17. 
75 A Afonso, 'Employer Strategies, cross-class coalitions and the free movement of labour in the 
enlarged European Union', Socio-Economic Review, 10 (2011), 705-30. 
76 D Schiek (2013) as footnote 3. 
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ments and the related threat with collective action as normal phenomena in a democ-
racy. This would prevent the Court from classifying the threat with collective action, 
mutual trade union support and the resulting collective agreements as a restriction of 
cross-border economic activity.  
Developing a European higher education sector from below?  
Beyond the field of creating an adequate system of labour relations and collective 
agreements on wages and other central employment conditions, the legal terrain for 
the constitution of social governance becomes more complex. There is no precise 
Treaty norm with privileges the cooperation of actors other than management and la-
bour producing EU level rules. However, this does not mean that there can be no EU 
level cooperation between societal actors other than management and labour. Ac-
cordingly, the constitution of social governance is not merely a new way of legitimising 
EU level collective bargaining, collective agreements and collective industrial action. It 
can be much more. 
The value basis for the constitution of social governance beyond regulatory and other 
relations of management and labour remains the same: a number of the EU’s objec-
tives in the social realm do not correspond to a full set of EU competences. As recog-
nised in Article 9 TFEU,77 the EU’s objectives such as full employment, social progress, 
social inclusion, social justice and social protection, as proclaimed in Article 3 (3) TEU, 
require among others, a high level of education. Nevertheless, the EU only has coordi-
native competences in combating social exclusion and the general modernisation of 
social protection systems (Article 153 (2) TFEU) and higher education (Article 6 (e) 
TFEU). For both fields, the literature discusses as options for EU level policies coordi-
nation of national policies, partly with involvement of civil society in an advisory ca-
pacity, intergovernmental cooperation beyond the EU and the impact of EU integra-
tion through law emanating from the law of the internal market.78 Accordingly, we ex-
pect that the dynamic interaction of judicial competences in enforcing the internal 
market, diverging national preferences and the lack of EU competences leads to dis-
ruption of functional policy making in these fields. The question is how social govern-
ance can be instituted without strong institutional support in these fields? The ques-
tion goes beyond civil society participation in devising EU politics, which has been 
widely researched79 and initiated a number of “NGO’s” with their registered office in 
Brussels whose sole purpose is to influence the EU institutions, above all the EU Com-
                                                          
77 According to that provision, the EU shall, in defining its policies and activities, “take into ac-
count requirements linked to a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social 
protection, the fight against social exclusion and a high level of education, training and protec-
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78 See for the field of combating social exclusion K Armstrong, 'The new governance of EU fiscal 
discipline', European Law Review, 38 (2013), 601-17, for the field of higher education S Garben, 
EU higher education law: the Bologna Process and Harmonisation by stealth (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer, 2011). 
79 A literature overview is provided by E Heidbreder, 'Civil Society Participation in EU 
Governane', Living Reviews in European Governance, 7 (2012) 
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mission.80 It rather seeks to find ways for non-governmental creation of EU level poli-
cies which can serve as a bridge over the gap illustrated above.  
The higher education sector is a good field for experimental exploration in this regard. 
The Court’s case law in on equal treatment rights of free moving workers and their 
children as well as non-economically active EU citizens has tackled the unequal treat-
ment of students all over Europe in relation to study fees. Again, the higher education 
sector is characterised by a high degree of diversity concerning the cost of studies: in 
some Member States universities can charge very low fees, while in others fees for in-
dividual students have reached considerable heights. The fee regimes are comple-
mented by national rules on support payments, which partly counterbalance the fees. 
In addition, in many Member States there are private universities, which partly oper-
ate different fee regimes. The diversities are compounded by differences in accessibil-
ity, especially for certain degrees. All this leads to a growth in comparison instru-
ments,81 and to movement of students to universities in other countries. The Court of 
Justice has heard a number of cases on this field, and developed a plethora of princi-
ples. Students who move to another Member State to study must not be discriminated 
against by the requirement of paying higher fees than nationals,82 and Member States 
must not restrict the number of EU foreigners accepted for study.83. However, unless 
students are workers at the same time,84 they can be excluded from maintenance 
grants, which in practice alleviating the fee burden, as long as they have not devel-
oped a sufficient link to their host state. 85 Further, the home state of any student 
                                                          
80 See for example European Network of Foundations for Social Economy  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.pefondes.eu/spip.php?page=article&id_article=15&lang=en" 
http://www.pefondes.eu/spip.php?page=article&id_article=15&lang=en  ; the EUCLID network  
HYPERLINK "http://euclidnetwork.eu/" http://euclidnetwork.eu/  ; European Association of 
Higher Education Institutions engaged in professional degrees  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.eurashe.eu/" http://www.eurashe.eu/   
81 One of these has even been funded by the EU Commission  CITATION EUR14 \l 2057   
EURODYCE, National Student Fees and Support Schemes in European Higher Education 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2014). 
82 First established in case 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593, now specified in Article 24 Directive 
2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
[OJ (2004) L158/88]. 
83 Cases C-147/03 COM v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969; C-65/03 COM v Belgium [2004] ECR I-6427; 
C-73/08 Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735. 
84 Students who are also workers must be treated equally in every aspect of access to higher 
education, including access to maintenance grants (the case C-46/12 L.N. (ECLI:EU:C:2013:97) 
confirmed this longstanding principle once again, while the case C-20/12 Giersch 
(ECLI:EU:C:2013:411) seems to impose some restrictions for children of frontier workers, who 
must satisfy a “sufficient link” criterion to avoid discrimination. EU legislation seems to suggest 
that such discrimination is not allowed – see Article 7, 8 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the 
European Parliament and the Council on freedom of movement of workers within the Union 
[OJ (2011) L 141/1]. On the spill-over effects of directly effective EU law on national higher ed-
ucation policy see also A. Gideon ‘The Position of Higher Education Institutions in a Changing 
European Context: An EU Law Perspective’ (2015) Journal of Common Market Studies (on-line 
first, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12235). 
85 Cases C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; C-158/07 
Förster [2009] ECR 663 have progressively raised the stakes for free moving students to access 
maintenance grants. These have now been codified in Article 24 Directive 2004/38. 
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must not place them in a detrimental situation because they seek to study in other 
Member States.86 As some of the cases cited illustrate, the incentives for students to 
migrate to other Member States may be particularly strong if these Member States of-
fer studies in easily accessible languages. The movement of students is uneven be-
tween Member States. For universities, this may create disincentives to participate in 
exchange programmes, which again may be detrimental not only for those students 
who aspire to study abroad, but also for those who do not move and have a less inter-
national experience due to lack of incoming students. All this cries out for systematic 
EU level regulation which goes beyond complementing the rights of free moving 
workers and EU citizens. However, the EU does not have the competence to harmo-
nise national laws (Article 165 TFEU). Can societal regulation fill this void? 
While this sector is considerably more determined by state regulations than wage 
settting, in many Member States universities have an independent or even fully au-
tonomous status. This could be the basis for establishing agreements containing rules 
on how to alleviate disruptions resulting from the different regimes. For example, uni-
versities could agree on establishing cooperation regimes which install systematic ob-
servation of burdens incurred by students moving between those universities, specific 
information regimes for staff and students and possibly even provide for payments in 
the case of a sustained imbalance of demand for study places. Such rules are beyond 
the regulatory capacity of the EU, although higher education could well be perceived 
as a social service as important as health care or pensions. As mentioned, there is no 
EU Treaty competence to create such legislation by way of harmonising national laws. 
This poses the question in how far higher education institutions can create contractual 
networks overcoming the disruption caused by the impact of internal market and EU 
Citizenship law on the sector. Cooperation between higher education institutions is 
not unknown. Next to younger initiatives which limit their activities to lose coopera-
tion and the production of policy papers,87 there are also more concrete cooperation 
structures. In some border regions higher education institutions from different mem-
ber states deliver common higher programmes and research activities, based on con-
tractual regimes under national law with the appropriate consent of national authori-
ties.88 These are often linked to regional co-operations on the basis of the European 
Grouping of Territorial Cooperation,89 created on the basis of Article 175 TFEU. Fur-
thering social governance in the education sector could possibly be eased by creating a 
similar regulation on the basis of Article 165 TFEU. Such a regulation would not insti-
tute harmonisation of national laws, but only create options for Europeanisation by 
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universities. It would thus not overstretch the legislative base. In the meantime, higher 
education institutions could expand contractual arrangements beyond regions, estab-
lishing reciprocity in student exchange as well as stable research co-operations.  
While this road to a constitution of social governance is much less well paved than in 
the labour relations field, it is not impossible that is proceeds with time. As in the la-
bour relations field, its legitimacy depends on providing institutions for negotiating 
conflicting interests of academics, students and the wider socio-economic environ-
ment of higher education institutions. Social governance is also negotiated govern-
ance, and that negotiation must occur in structures ensuring social justice procedurally 
and substantially. Developing those principles for new fields such as higher education 
is certainly a worthwhile endeavour.  
Conclusion 
The expansion of the values and objectives the EU strives to realise and achieve with-
out a correlative expansion of its competence base may appear as an indissoluble 
enigma.90 It may also be read as the basis for a constitution of social governance. Such 
dynamic interpretation of the EU Treaties would not seem more innovative than many 
of the interpretations delivered by the Court of Justice, ranging from direct effect of 
Treaty provisions to developing economic freedoms such as freedom to provide ser-
vices and freedom of corporate establishment into a Charta for business. It would 
complement these developments in such a way that the EU socio-economic constitu-
tion could live up to the challenges of humaneness. For the social policy realm broadly 
conceived as including employment rights, social inclusion policies and higher educa-
tion, such humaneness can be achieved by accepting institutions which allow self-
regulation of societies while at the same time guaranteeing procedural and substan-
tive justice. The time honoured categories of industrial democracy have progressively 
been integrated into the EU Treaties, starting with the Treaty of Amsterdam. For other 
emanations of social governance, secondary law might be a route forward, if socio-
economic actors should not be thrown back on national law institutions. In any case 
negotiated governance as social governance is a way to enhance the humaneness of 
the EU.  
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